ΟΛΥΜΠΙΑΚΟΣ ΘΡΥΛΟΣ ΑΡΡΩΣΤΕΙΑ

OLUMPIACOS

2019-10-31 Calypso APT: new group attacking state institutions

Attackers exploit Windows SMB vulnerability CVE-2017-0143 or use stolen credentials to gain access, deploy the custom Calypso RAT and use it to upload other tools such as Mimikatz, EternalBlue and EternalRomance. They move laterally and steal data.

Download. Email me if you need the password (see in my profile)

Malware Inventory (work in progress)

Links updated: Jan 19, 2023

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Other malware

Download. Email me if you need the password (see in my profile)

Hashes

MD5	SHA256	SHA1	Filename	File Tyee	Stage
aa1cf5791a60d56f7ae6da9bb1e7f01e	d5afa3bfd423ba060207ad025467feaa56ac53d13616ac8782a7f63c9fc0fdb4	bdd8b9115d1ae536d0ea1e62052485e5ad10761f	MPSSVC.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Payload
1e765fed294a7ad082169819c95d2c85	f6a09372156a8aef96576627a1ed9e57f194b008bb77e32ca29ac89505f933f0	60dda7ccd9ae00701046923b619a1b9c33c8e2ac	Wscntfy.exe	pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
17e05041730dcd0732e5b296db16d757	b6c21c26aef75ad709f6c9cfa84bfa15b7ee709588382ce4bc3544a04bceb661	f3301405d8ad5b160747241d6b2a8d88bf6292e8		pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
1ed72c14c4aab3b66e830e16ef90b37b	eebff21def49af4e85c26523af2ad659125a07a09db50ac06bd3746483c89f9d	dc0d0a34f107d140d9e47582e17a7fec945403ea	coal.exe	pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
e24a62d9826869bc4817366800a8805c	c407c3dde18c9b56ed24492ca257d77a570616074356b8c7854a080823f7ee17	53791c9e7c41931a6becb999fee4eb7daf9b1a11	data01.bin	pe dll	Calypso RAT Dropper
c9c39045fa14e94618dd631044053824	ab39301d45045172ad41c9a89210fdc6f0d3f9dccb567fd733b0dbffbfcfbcc3	1cda28bc307c09508dbb1f3495a967bbcc29326e		pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
69322703b8ef9d490a20033684c28493	e6a3b43acdaa824f3280095b10798ea341839f7d43f0460df8989f13c98fa6e0	f203680d97705d99f92fe9797691be6177f5fd41	RasCon.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Dropper
85ce60b365edf4beebbdd85cc971e84d	5dfdee5dd680948d19ab4d16df534cf10aca5fa0b157c59659d6517fe897c62f	d9c14f7b6de8e26ae33e41a72ae8e35bb1af4434		pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
6347e42f49a86aff2dea7c8bf455a52a	281583aca23f8fd8745dd88a600cbfc578d819859a13957ec022b86c3c1c99f4	8b2a81af85590e0e36efc1c05aa4f0600ea21545	HIDMgr.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Dropper
cb914fc73c67b325f948dd1bf97f5733	0031c7b63c1e1cd36d55f585d97e2b21a13a19858d5a1aa5455e5cc64b41e6e9	37ce4d0a3168e3b2f80b3fae38082e68a454aee0		pe exe	Calypso RAT Dropper
c84df4b2cd0d3e7729210f15112da7ac	4e8351ddaff18f7df6fcc27a3c75598e0c56d3b406818d45effb4e78616092c2	41a0c5a1aad36f405c8755613c732591e3300f97	mscorsvw.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Dropper
5199ef9d086c97732d97eddef56591ec	511683c8ee62478c2b45be1f782ce678bbe03c4349a1778651414803010b3ee9	d19a786adc09dff84642f2c2e0386193fa2a914b	dnscache.dll	pe dll	FlyingDutchman
06c1d7bf234ce99bb14639c194b3b318	a9a82099aa812d0c4025bee2b34f3b34c1d102773e36f1d50648815913dbe03d	464ab9e11d371bf24de46c98c295d4afe7e957c1	fromResource.exe	pedll	FlyingDutchman
617d588eccd942f243ffa8cb13679d9c	0664b09a86ec2df7dfe01a93e184a1fa23df66ea82cab39000944e418ec1f7b2	1b043fdcb582ed13cbf7dabcef6527762b5be93c		pe dll	Hussar
2807236c2d905a0675878e530ed8b1f8	314e438198f8cc2ee393c75f8e9f2ebd2b5133fd6f2b7deb1178f82782fc6330	2f6fe857632a67e87f4f3631bfa93713ccdf168a	AeLookupMgr.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Payload
cce8c8ee42feaed68e9623185c3f7fe4	38cc404437b936660066b71cc87a28af1995248d6d4c471706eb1dd347129b4b	9d2235c911b86bb6ad55d953a2f56ea78c5478e5	AppCert.dll.crt		Calypso RAT Payload
e1a578a069b1910a25c95e2d9450c710	413622ded5d344a5a78de4fea22cfdabdeb4cdccf69e9a1f58f668096c324738	36087a5b0809dc3f9dc5a77355a88e99af491a88	RasCfgMan.dll.crt		Calypso RAT Payload
0d532484193b8b098d7eb14319cefcd3	f8043d6bfc3e63d8561f7f74e65cb7ff1731577ecf6c7559795d9de21298f0fc	31f4c6dc6ce78b4e0439b30c830dfd5d9a3fc4fe	RasCfgMan.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Payload
974298eb7e2adfa019cae4d1a927ab07	0461710e681fd6dc9f1c83b57f94a88cd6df9e6432174cbfdd70dfd24577a0f8	41bc37679ce3caeecc176d10b4f8259918e25807	VirtualUMP.dll.crt		Calypso RAT Payload
05f472a9d926f4c8a0a372e1a7193998	8017923cd8169bf951106f053408b425f1eb310a9421685638ead55bb3823db3	8d909bd3450ebe0cffd0cb17b91bc28d23ef5083	EFSProvider.dll.crt		Calypso RAT Payload
d1a1166bec950c75b65fdc7361dcdc63	f3f38c097b0cc5337b7d2dbec098bf6d0a3bb4a3e0336e7b1c8af75268a0a49d	5731350f68a74fb4762c4ea878ecff635588a825	RasCon.dll	pe dll 64bits assembly	Calypso RAT Payload
e3e61f30f8a39cd7aa25149d0f8af5ef	c4dc7519bccc24c53794bf9178e4a4d0823875c34479d01cedbb3e9b10f5c730	1b75ea494c3ac171c5177bdcc263b89a3f24f207	MPSSVC.dll	pe dll	Calypso RAT Payload

Autoruns

My favorite choice when it comes to malware persistence is Sysinternals tools, Autoruns. In this paragraph, I mainly quote the official built-in help, but bear with me, it is still interesting.

On a side note, there are some problems with the Autoruns tool: it can only run on a live system. (EDIT: This is not true, Autoruns can analyze offline systems as well! Thanks to a comment from Justin.) And usually, this is not the case - I usually have dd images. And although VBoxManage can convert the dd images to VirtualBox disk image format, usually I don't have the time and storage to do that. This is where xmount awesomeness is here to rescue the day. It can convert dd and Encase images on-the-fly in-memory to Virtualbox format. Just attach the disk image to a new Virtualbox machine as the main boot HDD, modify the CPU/disk/controller settings until Windows starts instead of crashing, and voila, you can boot your forensic image - without modifying a single bit on the original evidence dd file. Another problem with malware analysis on a live system is that a good rootkit can fool the analyst easily.

For quick wins, I usually filter out Microsoft entries, look for per-user locations only and check for unverified (missing or invalid Authenticode) executables. This usually helps to find 90% of malware easily. Especially if it has a color like purple or pink, it is highly suspicious. To find the rest, well, one has to dig deeper.

Zeus "hiding" in the usual random directory - check the faked timestamp

To implement "poor-mans monitoring", regularly save the output of Autoruns, and during incident response, it will be highly valuable. Howto guide here.

Logon

"This entry results in scans of standard autostart locations such as the Startup folder for the current user and all users, the Run Registry keys, and standard application launch locations."

There are 42 registry keys/folders at the moment in Autoruns, which can be used to autostart a malware. The most common ways are the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup folder.

One of my favorite regarding this topic is the file-less Poweliks malware, 100% pure awesomeness. Typical ring 3 code execution.

Explorer

"Select this entry to see Explorer shell extensions, browser helper objects, explorer toolbars, active setup executions, and shell execute hooks". 71 registry keys, OMG. Usually, this is not about auto-malware execution, but some of them might be a good place to hide malware.

Internet explorer

"This entry shows Browser Helper Objects (BHO's), Internet Explorer toolbars and extensions". 13 registry key here. If a malicious BHO is installed into your browser, you are pretty much screwed.

Scheduled tasks

"Task scheduler tasks configured to start at boot or logon." Not commonly used, but it is important to look at this.

I always thought this part of the autostart entries is quite boring, but nowadays, I think it is one of the best ways to hide your malware. There are so many entries here by default, and some of them can use quite good tricks to trigger the start.

Did you know that you can create custom events that trigger on Windows event logs?

Did you know you can create malware persistence just by using Windows tools like bitsadmin and Scheduled tasks?

Scheduler in the old days

Scheduler in the new days

Services

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services is a very commonplace to hide malware, especially rootkits. Check all entries with special care.

Drivers

Same as services. Very commonplace for rootkits. Unfortunately, signing a driver for 64-bit systems is not fun anymore, as it has to be signed by certificates that can be chained back to "Software Publisher Certificates". Typical startup place for Ring 0 rootkits.

Starting from Windows 10, even this will change and all drivers have to be signed by "Windows Hardware Developer Center Dashboard portal" and EV certificates.

Codecs

22 registry keys. Not very common, but possible code execution.

Boot execute

"Native images (as opposed to Windows images) that run early during the boot process."

5 registry keys here. Good place to hide a rootkit here.

Image hijacks

"Image file execution options and command prompt autostarts." 13 registry key here. I believe this was supposed for debugging purposes originally.

This is where the good-old sticky keys trick is hiding. It is a bit different from the others, as it provides a backdoor access, but you can only use this from the local network (usually). The trick is to execute your code whenever someone presses the SHIFT key multiple times before logging into RDP. The old way was to replace the sethc.exe, the new fun is to set a debug program on sethc.

If you see this, you are in trouble

AppInit

"This has Autoruns shows DLLs registered as application initialization DLLs." Only 3 registry keys here. This is the good old way to inject a malicious DLL into Explorer, browsers, etc. Luckily it is going to be deprecated soon.

Known DLLs

"This reports the location of DLLs that Windows loads into applications that reference them." Only 1 registry key. This might be used to hijack some system DLLs.

Winlogon

"Shows DLLs that register for Winlogon notification of logon events." 7 registry keys. Sometimes used by malware.

Winsock providers

"Shows registered Winsock protocols, including Winsock service providers. Malware often installs itself as a Winsock service provider because there are few tools that can remove them. Autoruns can disable them, but cannot delete them." 4 registry keys. AFAIK this was trendy a while ago. But still, a good place to hide malware.

Print monitors

"Displays DLLs that load into the print spooling service. Malware has used this support to autostart itself." 1 registry key. Some malware writers are quite creative when it comes to hiding their persistence module.

LSA providers

"Shows registers Local Security Authority (LSA) authentication, notification and security packages." 5 registry keys. A good place to hide your password stealer.

Network providers

"Missing documentation". If you have a good 1 sentence documentation, please comment.

WMI filters

"Missing documentation". Check Mandiant for details.

Sidebar gadgets

Thank god MS disabled this a while ago :)

We all miss you, you crappy resource gobble nightmares

Common ways - not in autoruns

Now, let's see other possibilities to start your malware, which won't be listed in Sysinternals Autoruns.

Backdoor an executable/DLL

Just change the code of an executable which is either auto-starting or commonly started by the user. To avoid lame mistakes, disable the update of the file ... The backdoor factory is a good source for this task. But if you backdoor an executable/DLL which is already in Autoruns listed, you will break the Digital Signature on the file. It is recommended to sign your executable, and if you can't afford to steal a trusted certificate, you can still import your own CA into the user's trusted certificate store (with user privileges), and it will look like a trusted one. Protip: Use "Microsoft Windows" as the codesigner CA, and your executable will blend in.

See, rootkit.exe totally looks legit, and it is filtered out when someone filters for "Hide Windows entries".

Hijack DLL load order

Just place your DLL into a directory which is searched before the original DLL is found, and PROFIT! But again, to avoid lame detection, be sure to proxy the legitimate function calls to the original DLL. A good source on this topic from Mandiant and DLL hijack detector.

Here you can see how PlugX works in action, by dropping a legitimate Kaspersky executable, and hijacking the DLL calls with their DLL.

Hijack a shortcut from the desktop/start menu

Never underestimate the power of lame tricks. Just create an executable which calls the original executable, and meanwhile starts your backdoor. Replace the link, PROFIT! And don't be a skiddie, check the icon ;) I have seen this trick in adware hijacking browsers a lot of times.

IE hijacked to start with http://tinyurl.com/2fcpre6

File association hijack

Choose the user's favorite file type, replace the program which handles the opening with a similar one described in the previous section, and voila!

COM object hijack

The main idea is that some COM objects are scanned for whether they are on the system or not, and when it is registered, it is automatically loaded. See COMpfun for details.

Windows Application Compatibility - SHIM

Not many people are familiar with Windows Application Compatibility and how it works. Think about it as an added layer between applications and the OS. If the application matches a certain condition (e.g. filename), certain actions will take place. E.g. emulation of directories, registry entries, DLL injection, etc. In my installation, there are 367 different compatibility fixes (type of compatibility "simulation"), and some of those can be customized.

Every time IE starts, inject a DLL into IE

Bootkits

Although bootkits shown here can end up in Autoruns in the drivers section (as they might need a driver at the end of the day), I still think it deserves a different section.

MBR - Master boot record

Malware can overwrite the Master boot record, start the boot process with its own code, and continue the boot process with the original one. It is common for rootkits to fake the content of the MBR record, and show the original contents. Which means one just have attached the infected HDD to a clean system, and compare the first 512 bytes (or more in some cases) with a known, clean state, or compare it to the contents shown from the infected OS. SecureBoot can be used to prevent malware infections like this.

There is a slight difference when MBR is viewed from infected OS vs clean OS

VBR - Volume boot record

This is the next logical step where malware can start it's process, and some malware/rootkit prefers to hide it's startup code here. Check GrayFish for details. SecureBoot can be used to prevent malware infections like this.

BIOS/UEFI malware

Both the old BIOS and the new UEFI can be modified in a way that malware starts even before the OS had a chance to run. Although UEFI was meant to be more secure than BIOS, implementation and design errors happens. Check the Computrace anti-theft rootkit for details.

Hypervisor - Ring -1 rootkit

This is somewhat special, because I believe although rootkit can run in this layer but it can't persist only in this layer on an average, physical machine, because it won't survive a reboot See Rutkowska's presentation from 2006 But because the hypervisor can intercept the restart event, it can write itself into one of the other layers (e.g. install a common kernel driver), and simply delete it after it is fully functional after reboot. Update: There is a good paper from Igor Korkin about hypervisor detection here.

SMM (System Management Mode) malware - Ring -2 rootkit

Somehow related to the previous type of attacks, but not many people know that System Management Mode can be used to inject code into the OS. Check the DEITYBOUNCE malware for more details ;) Also, abusing Intel Dual Monitor Mode (DMM) can lead to untrusted code execution, which basically monitors the SMM mode.

Intel® Active Management Technology - Ring -3 rootkit

According to Wikipedia, "Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) is hardware and firmware technology for remote out-of-band management of personal computers, in order to monitor, maintain, update, upgrade, and repair them". You can ask, what could possibly go wrong? See Alexander Tereshkin's and Rafal Wojtczuk's great research on this, or Vassilios Ververis thesis about AMT.

As not many people click on links, let me quote the scary stuff about AMT:

Independent of the main CPU
Can access host memory via DMA (with restrictions)
Dedicated link to NIC, and its filtering capabilities
Can force host OS to reboot at any time (and boot the system from the emulated CDROM)
Active even in S3 sleep!

Other stuff

Create new user, update existing user, hidden admins

Sometimes one does not even have to add malicious code to the system, as valid user credentials are more than enough. Either existing users can be used for this purpose, or new ones can be created. E.g. a good trick is to use the Support account with a 500 RID - see here, Metasploit tool here.

Esoteric firmware malware

Almost any component in the computer runs with firmware, and by replacing the firmware with a malicious one, it is possible to start the malware. E.g. HDD firmware (see GrayFish again), graphic card, etc.

Hidden boot device

Malware can hide in one of the boot devices which are checked before the average OS is loaded, and after the malware is loaded, it can load the victim OS.

Network-level backdoor

Think about the following scenario: every time the OS boots, it loads additional data from the network. It can check for new software updates, configuration updates, etc. Whenever a vulnerable software/configuration update, the malware injects itself into the response, and get's executed. I know, this level of persistence is not foolproof, but still, possible. Think about the recently discovered GPO MiTM attack, the Evilgrade tool, or even the Xensploit tool when we are talking about VM migration.

Software vulnerability

Almost any kind of software vulnerability can be used as a persistent backdoor. Especially, if the vulnerability can be accessed remotely via the network, without any user interaction. Good old MS08-067...

Hardware malware, built into the chipset

I am not sure what to write here. Ask your local spy agency for further information. Good luck finding those!